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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. H., by and through 
his Guardian ad Litem, H. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WEST VALLEY CITY, WEST ] 
VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, ] 
and JENE V. LYDAY, individually 
Defendants-Appellant. 
I Case No. 900052 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is proper in the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) whieh 
states: 
"The Supreme court has appellate jurisdiction 
. . . over , , . orders, judgments and decrees 
of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction." 
A review Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3, 
outlining th*»< )>it s<:. ' wn of the Utah Court: ot Appeals, indicates 
that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to 
hear any appeal of a District Court Civil Dispute. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was West Valley guilty of "deliberate indifference" 
to the rights of its r 11; I zeits iihen it hired »J pol we otficei and 
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placed that officer in charge of young people without having 
conducted a complete and thorough investigation of the officer's 
background, including psychological testing? 
2. Is there a constitutional "right of privacy" which 
would protect an individual from undesired sexual molestation and 
abuse at the hands of a police officer acting under "color of law"? 
3. Is a police officer acting within the course and 
scope of his employment when he sexually assaults an individual in 
the context of activities authorized, directed and approved by the 
officer's employer? 
4. Is a municipality liable for the acts of an employee 
who has been placed in a position of management and trust by the 
municipality, and that employee later takes advantage of the 
position in which he has been placed to sexually molest one who has 
been placed in his charge? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (See Addendum). 
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-6(7) (See 
Addendum). 
3. Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-6.5 (See 
Addendum). 
4. Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-9 (See Addendum). 
5. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) (See Addendum). 
6c Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (See Addendum). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff filed claims against West Valley City and the 
West Valley City Police Department (hereinafter "West Valley") 
alleging negligence in hiring, Respondeat Superior, and violations 
of 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983. These claims arose from sexual abuse 
which was committed by the Defendant, Jene V. Lyday, on two or more 
occasions in April of 1986. This is an appeal from the trial 
court's order granting the summary judgment motion of West Valley. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff's claims against West Valley were filed on or 
about October 7, 1987. Plaintiff claimed that West Valley was 
negligent in failing to completely and thoroughly check the 
background of Lyday before hiring him as a police officer and later 
installing him as the advisor of a Law Enforcement Explorer Post 
organized by the City. Plaintiff further alleged that West 
Valley's failure to completely and thoroughly check Lyday's 
background before hiring him as a police officer constituted 
"deliberate indifference" toward the rights of the citizens of West 
Valley which would subject West Valley to liability under 42 
U.S.C.A. Section 1983. Plaintiff also alleged that the abuse and 
assault committed by Lyday was, given the peculiar facts of the 
case, within the course and scope of Lydayfs employment with West 
Valley and that West Valley would therefore be liable to Plaintiff 
under the theory of Respondeat Superior. Plaintiff finally alleged 
that West Valley is liable for the acts of Lyday because it had 
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placed Lyday in a position of trust and authority, whereby Lyday 
was able to defraud and otherwise take advantage of Plaintiff. 
Wfest Valley filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with 
memorandums in support thereof. Plaintiff filed memorandums 
opposing summary judgment. A hearing was held before Judge David 
S. Young of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
on October 30, 1989. Judge Young ruled that there was no genuine 
issue as to any material fact regarding any of Plaintiff's claims, 
and that West Valley was entitled to summary judgment on all claims 
raised by Plaintiff. A written order was subsequently signed by 
Judge Young on November 29, 1989 granting summary judgment to West 
Valley as to all claims of Plaintiff. 
The summary judgment granted in favor of West Valley was 
not a complete and final disposition of the matter inasmuch as 
claims against Jene Lyday still remained pending. A Rule 54(b) 
certification was therefore signed by Judge Young on January 17, 
1990. Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was later filed on January 26, 
1990. 
Facts 
Jene V. Lyday was hired as a police officer by West 
Valley in July of 1980. (Lyday Deposition, pp. 10-11.) The 
decision to hire Mr. Lyday as an officer was made by David C. 
Campbell, the newly appointed chief of the West Valley City Police 
Department. (Affidavit of David C. Campbell, para. 13.) Mr. 
Campbell had known Lyday previously, as both had served on the Salt 
Lake City Police Department. (Lyday Deposition, pp 9-10.) The 
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only background check to confirm Mr. Lyday's fitness for service 
as a police officer consisted of (1) a criminal background check, 
and (2) an "extensive Personal Statement Form" completed by Lyday, 
wherein he was given an opportunity to list examples of prior 
conduct or other information which might disqualify him from 
service as a police officer. Beyond the criminal background check, 
there was no attempt to verify Lyday's claims in the Personal 
Statement Form. There was no attempt to contact his wife, family, 
friends or associates. There was likewise no effort to perform 
psychological testing, which might reveal deviant characteristics. 
(Affidavit of Gerald Maughan, paras. 10-12; Lyday Deposition, p. 
49.) 
Mr. Lyday was subsequently asked by Chief Campbell to 
serve as the advisor of a Law Enforcement Explorer Post which West 
Valley had determined to organize and sponsor. Lyday agreed to 
serve in this capacity. (Lyday Deposition p. 16; Affidavit of 
David C. Campbell, para. 16.) He was not required at this time to 
undergo any additional testing or background checks to verify his 
fitness to serve in this delicate capacity. He served as the 
advisor to the Explorer Post from September of 1984 to April of 
1986. He did not submit to any ongoing training program during 
this period of time, nor was he observed or supervised by any other 
person in the fulfillment of his duties. (Lyday Deposition, pp. 
15, 24, 43-45, 48-49, 62-63.) 
Plaintiff joined the Law Enforcement Explorer Post 
sponsored by West Valley in October of 1985. (Affidavit of J. H., 
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para. 1.) Plaintiff joined the Post because of his interest in 
police work and his desire to consider making police work his own 
career. (Lyday Deposition pp. 22-23.) He, along with all other 
young men and women who joined the Post, was informed at the time 
of his acceptance into the Post that it was imperative that he obey 
the commands and instructions of West Valley police officers, and 
that he would particularly be subject to the supervision, direction 
and control of Jene V. Lyday, the advisor of the Explorer Post. 
He and other members of the post were advised that failure to obey 
the directions and instructions of Lyday could result in dismissal 
from the Post. (Affidavit of J. H., Paras. 5, 8-10.) 
While a member of the Explorer Post, Plaintiff performed 
various duties and responsibilities. He frequently interacted with 
Lyday in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. 
(Lyday deposition, pp. 29-30, 34-35, 47-48.) 
Lyday finally sexually molested Plaintiff on April 10, 1986, 
and again on April 17, 1986. In each of these instances, Plaintiff 
was with Lyday in Lydayfs patrol car being driven home following 
a Post activity. (Affidavit of J. H., paras. 15, 17.) Lyday 
committed the molestations under the pretense that he was teaching 
Plaintiff standard and accepted "relaxation techniques" which 
police officers relied upon to deal with their stressful 
occupation. (Affidavit of J. H., para. 14; Lyday Deposition, p. 
69.) 
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Summary of Arguments 
1. Summary Judgment should be granted only when there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact after considering the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. 
2. West Valley acted with "deliberate indifference" to 
the rights of its citizens when it hired a police officer without 
conducting proper background checks and otherwise verifying the 
fitness of Lyday for police service. This "deliberate 
indifference" continued when Lyday was placed in a delicate 
position of trust dealing with young people as Explorer Post 
Advisor without being properly trained, qualified or supervised. 
3. Plaintiff's constitutional "right of privacy" was 
violated when he was sexually molested by Lyday. 
4. West Valley is liable for the acts of Lyday under 
the doctrine of Respondeat Superior because Lyday was in the scope 
of his employment when the wrongful acts occurred. 
5. West Valley negligently hired and placed Lyday in 
a delicate position of trust as the manager and supervisor of young 
people in the Explorer Post. A special situation was thereby 
created imposing liability on West Valley for the wrongful acts 
which later resulted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there exists no 
genuine issue as to any material fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
moving party has the burden of proving there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and must show entitlement to Summary Judgment 
beyond any doubt. Adickes v. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157; 
26 L.Ed. 2d 142; 9 S.Ct. 1598 (1970). Madison v. Deseret Livestock 
Company, 574 F.2d 1027, 1037 (10th Cir. 1978). In considering a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the materials presented by the parties 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc.. 369 U.S. 654; 8 L.Ed. 
2d 176; 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962). If any inferences can be drawn from 
the facts that might allow recovery, then Summary Judgment is not 
appropriate. Exnicous v. United States. 563 F.2d 418, 423-24 (10th 
Cir. 1977) . Courts are generally not in a good position to render 
summary judgment on issues of negligence, and the prerogative of 
a jury to make its own determination on such issues should not be 
infringed. Singleton v. Alexander. 431 P.2d 126, 19 Utah 2d 292 
(1967) . 
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POINT II 
A MUNICIPALITY WHICH ACTS WITH "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE" 
FOR THE SAFETY OF ITS CITIZENS. IS SUBJECT TO SUIT 
UNDER SECTION 1983 
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly ruled in the case of 
Citv of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. , 103 L.Ed. 2d 412; 
109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989), that a municipality is liable under 42 
U.S.C.A. Section 1983 if it acts with "deliberate indifference" to 
the rights of its citizens with constitutional violations later 
resulting from its failure to screen, train and supervise municipal 
employees. 
In Canton. the Plaintiff brought an action against the 
city alleging that police employees failed to provide proper 
medical treatment to her while she was in custody. The lack of 
proper medical treatment resulted in her subsequent 
hospitalization. Testimony was offered to the effect that the city 
of Canton did not provide any special medical training for shift 
commanders who were responsible for insuring that detainees receive 
appropriate medical treatment. A jury verdict was awarded in the 
Plaintiff's favor and the city appealed. 
The City contended that only unconstitutional policies 
followed by a municipality should be subject to suit under Section 
1983. The Court held that "failure to train" actually constitutes 
in an appropriate case a "policy" of the municipality and can be 
the basis for liability under Section 1983. (Id. at 1200.) The 
Court noted that all Courts of Appeals have ruled similarly, 
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although there was confusion as to the degree of fault that must 
be evidenced before liability can be imposed. (Id. at 1204.) The 
Supreme Court then defined the standard as one of "deliberate 
indifference", stating: "the inadequacy of police training may 
serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability only where the 
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights 
of persons with whom police come into contact." fid.) The Court 
elaborated: 
The issue in a case like this one, 
however, is whether that training program is 
adequate; and if it is not the question becomes 
whether such inadequate training can 
justifiably be said to represent "city policy." 
It may seem contrary to common sense to assert 
the municipality will actually have a policy 
of not taking reasonable steps to train its 
employees. But it may happen that in light of 
the duties assigned to specific officers or 
employees the need for more or different 
training is so obvious, and the inadeguacv so 
likely to result in the violation of 
constitutional rights, that the policy makers 
of the citv can reasonably be said to have been 
deliberately indifferent to the need. In that 
event the failure to provide proper training 
may fairly be said to represent the policy for 
which the city is responsible, and for which 
the city may be held liable if it actually 
causes injury. (Id. at 1205. Emphasis added.) 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that a 
municipality can be found liable for "deliberate indifference" to 
the needs of its citizens when it fails to take appropriate steps 
to train members of its police force. In Garcia v. Salt Lake 
County. 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985) the 10th Circuit considered 
a case where a party had died while in custody of Salt Lake County 
jail officials. At the time of his incarceration it was known that 
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the decedent had medical problems, and his jailers were instructed 
to check on him every fifteen to twenty minutes. He died several 
hours after his incarceration, apparently due to a drug overdose. 
Experts testified at trial that proper observation by jail 
personnel of decedent's condition would have resulted in his being 
transferred to a proper medical facility where his life could have 
been saved. A judgment against Salt Lake County in the amount of 
$150,000.00 was awarded by the jury. 
On appeal, the 10th Circuit held that failure to provide 
adequate medical care is a violation of a prisoner's constitutional 
rights "if it is a result of deliberate indifference to a 
prisoner's serious medical need." (Id. at 307.) The court then 
defined "deliberate indifference" as "such gross deficiencies in 
staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate is 
effectively denied access to adequate medical care." (Id. at 308) . 
The Court concluded that the jury's verdict against the County was 
supported by sufficient evidence of gross deficiencies in staffing 
and other procedures at the jail. (Id.) 
Plaintiff claims that West Valley was deliberately indifferent 
to the rights of its citizens when it hired Lyday, and later placed 
him in a powerful position of trust and authority over young 
people, without first taking appropriate steps to certify that 
Lyday did not present an unreasonable danger to West Valley 
citizens. This "deliberate indifference" continued as Lyday was 
allowed to interact with the young people and "stalk his prey" with 
virtually no interference from superiors to supervise or observe 
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his activities. West Valley counters that it was careful, and that 
Lyday was screened through (1) a criminal background investigation, 
and (2) an "extensive Personal Statement Form" completed by Lyday 
inquiring of prior conduct of a disqualifying nature. However, it 
is clear thcit the criminal background check revealed nothing more 
than that Lyday had been successful in repressing his desires, 
and/or eluding discovery. Beyond that, to assume that Lyday would 
deliberately reveal his deviant desires in the Personal Statement 
Form, and thus disqualify himself from his chosen career, is simply 
ludicrous. It is thus clear that the screening techniques of West 
Valley were superficial and inadequate. 
West Valley declined the opportunity to conduct more in-
depth and reliable checks into the character of Lyday. Interviews 
with his wife, family, friends or associates would certainly be 
more reliable forms of information than a "Personal Statement 
Form". More importantly, psychological testing might have been 
conducted which could have revealed disorders that Lyday outwardly 
hid. In this regard, Plaintiff relied on the Affidavit of Arthur 
Brown, Ph.D, which certified that: 
1. Individuals with deviant sexual traits gravitate to 
those occupations which will enable them to prey upon 
children; 
2. Young people are easily influenced and manipulated 
by authority figures such as police officers; 
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3. Appropriate psychological tests which can detect and 
weed out individuals who are threats to molest children were 
available when Lyday was hired by West Valley. 
In Wassum v. Citv of Bellaire. Texas, 861 F.2d 453 (5th 
Cir. 1988) the Court considered a case where a police dispatcher 
for the Bellaire Police Department was raped by one of the police 
officers on the force. The victim filed an action against the city 
under Section 1983, alleging negligence in hiring the officer. 
The city moved for Summary Judgment which was granted by the trial 
court, and upheld by the 5th Circuit on appeal. In upholding 
Defendants motion for Summary Judgment, the Court noted the 
extensive efforts on the part of the city to verify the fitness of 
the officer for service: 
. . . the uncontradicted evidence reflects that 
in 1981 it was the policy of Bellaire to 
generally follow the recommended hiring 
guidelines of the Texas Commission on Law 
Enforcement Officers Standards and Education 
(TCLEOSE). In accordance with these 
guidelines, Bellaire interviewed supervisors 
at two previous police departments that 
employed Casey (the defendant); conducted 
national (NCIC) and state criminal record 
computer checks; submitted Casey's finger 
prints to state and federal authorities; 
interviewed Caseyfs former wife and several 
references; and required Casev to be certified 
as physically and psychologically fit by a 
licensed physician. (Emphasis added.) 
On the other hand, other Courts have ruled that reliance 
on lesser standards in the hiring of police officers can result in 
municipal liability under Section 1983. In Hild v. Bruner, 496 F. 
Supp. 93 (D.N.J. 1980) the municipality appealed from a jury 
verdict for alleged false arrest and civil rights violations under 
Section 1983. Plaintiff's civil rights claims were based on the 
failure of the city to administer psychological testing to its 
police officers. Expert testimony at trial established that such 
testing had become widely accepted by at least 1975. On the basis 
of this evidence, the Court held that the jury reasonably could 
conclude that the City's failure to administer psychological 
testing constituted gross negligence, thus entitling Plaintiff to 
relief under Section 1983. (Id. at 99.) 
It should also be observed that standards mandated by the Utah 
State Legislature indicate that the screening procedure employed 
by West Valley was inadequate in this case. At the time Lyday was 
hired as a police officer by West Valley, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 67-15-6(7) required that every applicant for a position on 
a police force be "free of any physical, emotional or mental 
conditions which may adversely affect the performance of duty as 
a peace officer." It would be impossible to confirm that an 
applicant is free of disqualifying mental or emotional conditions 
without administering some form of psychological test. 
Nevertheless, West Valley did not require Lyday to submit to any 
psychologiccil or mental testing which might certify his compliance 
with this requirement. In fact, no evidence currently available 
suggests that West Valley had any information as to the 
psychological fitness of Lyday when he was hired by the West Valley 
City Police Department. 
The above facts clearly establish that there are 
substantial factual issues which are not resolved appropriately by 
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Summary Judgment. The standards employed by West Valley in hiring 
and supervising the activities of Mr. Lyday do not meet standards 
followed by other law enforcement agencies, nor do they satisfy 
standards mandated by the Utah State Legislature. Furthermore, Dr. 
Brown would testify that appropriate screening and supervision of 
Mr. Lyday would likely have prevented the abuse from occurring. 
In view of these facts, it is inappropriate for a Court to state 
as a matter of law that the City adhered to the standards of care 
required of it. A reasonable juror could find that the City's 
deficient procedures evidenced a "deliberate indifference" to the 
interests of the citizens of the City. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT OF PRIVACY" 
WAS VIOLATED 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have clearly recognized that there is a constitutionally 
protected "right of privacy". In Redding v. Brady. 606 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a case where 
a student newspaper had sought information regarding salaries of 
Weber State College employees. The college refused to provide the 
requested information, whereupon the newspaper filed an action in 
Court which resulted in a court order requiring the college to 
supply the requested salary information. The college appealed, 
arguing that to supply such information would be a violation of the 
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rights of privacy of its employees. In discussing this 
constitutional "right of privacy" the Court stated: 
It seems sufficient for our purpose herein to 
say that what the right of privacy protects is 
to be determined by applying the commonly 
accepted standards of social propriety. This 
includes those aspects of an individuals 
activities and manner of living that would 
generally be regarded as being of such personal 
and private nature as to belong to himself and 
to be of no proper concern to others. The 
right should extend to protect intrusion into 
or exposure of not only things which might 
result in actual harm or damage, but also to 
things which might result in shame or 
humiliation, or merely violate ones pride in 
keeping his private affairs to himself. 
Id. at 1195 (Emphasis added.) 
The United States Supreme Court has also affirmed on many 
occasions that there is a constitutionally protected right to 
privacy. This constitutional right of privacy was recognized early 
on by the United States Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 38 L.Ed. 1047; 14 S.Ct. 1125, 
(1894) wherein the Court stated that the principles that embody the 
essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions 
of the sanctity of a man's home, "and the privacies of his life." 
[See also Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed. 2d 510, 
85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965) referring to the right of privacy as a right 
older than the Bill of Rights; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
19 L.Ed. 2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967) stating that various 
provisions of the Federal Constitution protect personal privacy 
from governmental invasion; Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328, 95 S.Ct. 1029 (1975). See generally 
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16 Am.Jur. 2nd, Constitutional Law, Sections 601-603.] 
Furthermore, the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C.A. Section 552a) 
contains a congressional finding that "the right to privacy is a 
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the 
United States." 
In Martin v. Covington, Ky., 541 F. Supp. 803 (E. D. Ky. 
1982) the Court considered a case where a minor plaintiff had been 
forced by police to solicit homosexual acts. He was not required 
to actually engage in such acts, but he was forced to engage in 
negotiations for the same. The Defendants claimed that there had 
been no violation of the Plaintiff's Federal constitutional rights, 
and that a Section 1983 claim would therefore not lie. The Court 
responded: " . . . for the police through threats, intimidation, 
harassment and abuse of official power to force someone to engage 
in homosexual solicitation against his will is an undoubted 
violation of his human dignity and constitutional right of privacy, 
and thus is a deprivation of liberty committed under color of state 
law. Such violation may be redressed, if proven, by an action 
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983." 
If the right of privacy exists at all, it must certainly 
extend to the right of a person to be free from undesired sexual 
molestation at the hands of another. There can be little doubt 
that Lyday's sexual misconduct and abuse of Plaintiff was a 
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy. 
Furthermore, the violation was committed while Lyday was on duty 
with the police department, participating in activities which were 
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approved and authorized by the City. The violation occurred in 
Lyday's police patrol car, with all the paraphenalia of his 
employment as a police officer close at hand. It is thus 
reasonable to conclude that the violation occurred "under color of 
law", and is actionable under Section 1983. 
POINT IV 
THE MUNICIPALITY IS LIABLE FOR THE TORTIOUS ACTS 
OF A POLICE OFFICER WHO ACTS UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY 
In Phillips v. JCM Development Corporation. 666 P. 2d 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the general rule 
concerning the familiar doctrine of "Respondeat Superior". The 
court stated the rule as follows: 
The general rule is that a principal [employer] is liable 
civilly for the tortious acts of his agent [employee] 
which are done within the course and scope of the agent's 
employment [citation omitted]. 
Id. at 881. 
In Birkner v. Salt Lake County 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 
1989), the Court stated: 
As a general rule, the issue of whether an employee acted 
within the scope of employment is a factual question to 
be decided by the trier of fact [citation omitted]. The 
scope of employment issue must be submitted to the jury 
[w]hen€*ver reasonable minds may differ as to whether the 
[employee] was at a certain time involved wholly or 
partly in the performance of his masters business or 
within the scope of his employment..." [citation 
omitted]. 
Id. at 20. See also Lane v. Messer. 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986). 
In White v. County of Orange 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 571-
72, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985) the County was held civilly liable 
for an officer's threat of rape because it was done under authority 
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of a Deputy Sheriff, an agent of the County. The Court found that 
the actions of the officer were "incident to his duties". The 
policy arguments cited by the Court in reaching this conclusion are 
very pertinent to this case, and are therefore cited at some 
length: 
A police officer is entrusted with a great deal of 
authority. . . . the police officer carries the authority 
of the law with him into the community. The officer is 
supplied with a conspicuous automobile, a badge and a 
gun to insure immediate compliance with his directions. 
The officer's method of dealing with this authority is 
certainly incidental to his duties; indeed, it is an 
integral part of them. . . . 
It follows that the employer/government must be 
responsible for acts done during the exercise of this 
authority. In Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat (1979) 92 
Cal. App. 3d 503, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874, the court, quoting 
the Restatement, 2d, agency, stated: If the principal 
places the agent in a position to defraud, and the third 
person relies upon his apparent authority to make the 
representations, the principal is liable even though the 
agent was acting for his own purposes [citations]. The 
theory is that the agent's position facilitates the 
consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view 
of the third person the transaction seems regular on its 
face and the agent appears to be acting in an ordinary 
course of the business confided to him. It is immaterial 
that the principal receives no benefit from the 
transaction, [citation omitted]. 
This reasoning directly addresses the situation presented 
here. White alleges she stopped solely because she was 
ordered to do so by the Deputy Sheriff. In other words, 
she relied on the officer's apparent authority. Had 
Laudermilk not been a Deputy Sheriff, in uniform, in a 
marked patrol vehicle using flashing red lights, White 
would not have stopped at his direction and the events 
that followed would not have occurred. Because the 
County placed Laudermilk in this position of authority, 
they will be liable for his actions should White prove 
her allegations at trial. 
The use of authority is incidental to the duties of a 
police officer. The County enjoys tremendous benefits 
from the public's respect of that authority. Therefore, 
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they must suffer the consequences when the authority is 
abused. 
In Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 119, 121, (La. 
App. 1979) a woman filed a complaint against the city alleging a 
cause of action under respondeat superior for sexual acts which a 
police officer forced her to engage in against her will. The court 
ruled that there was a valid claim against the city: 
The City maintains that the actions of Crowe (the police 
officer) are far removed from the course and scope of his 
employment and that it should not be vicariously 
responsible for sexual abuses committed by its officers. 
Due to the particular facts of this case, that argument 
has no merit. 
We particularly note that Officer Crowe was on duty in 
uniform and armed and was operating a police unit at the 
time of this incident. He was able to separate the 
plaintiff from her companions because of the force and 
authority of the position which he held. He took her 
into police custody and then committed the sexual abuses 
upon her in the vehicle provided for his use by his 
employer. 
A police officer is a public servant given considerable 
public trust and authority. Our review of the 
jurisprudence indicates that, almost uniformly, where 
excesses are committed by such officers, their employers 
are held to be responsible for their actions even though 
those actions maybe somewhat removed from their usual 
duties« This is unquestionably the case because of the 
position of such officers in our society. 
In another Louisiana case, Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 
1295-6 (La. App. 1986) the Court held that the State was liable 
for sexual abuses committed by a National Guard Recruiting Officer. 
The recruiting officer had represented to women whom he was 
attempting to recruit that he was authorized to perform physical 
examinations. He was thereby able to persuade the young women to 
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disrobe and submit to his examination. The court discussed the 
Statefs liability as follows: 
If the tortious conduct of the employee is so closely 
connected in time, place, and causation to his employment 
duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly 
attributable to the employer fs business . . . it can then 
be regarded as within the scope of the employee's 
employment, so that the employer is liable in tort to 
third persons injured thereby. 
Sudduth's (the officer's) battery upon the young women 
was closely connected in time, place, and causation to 
his employment duties. The sergeant visited the girls 
in his capacity as a recruiting officer after they 
expressed a desire to enter the Louisiana National Guard. 
The Turner home where the incident occurred was located 
in . . . the recruiting area assigned to Sgt. Sudduth 
and the incident occurred during working hours. During 
the interview process, he mislead the young women into 
believing that he had authority to conduct a physical 
examination. Thus, the tortious conduct committed by 
Sgt. Sudduth was reasonably incidental to the performance 
of his duties as a recruiting officer although totally 
unauthorized by the employer and obviously motivated by 
his personal interest. Furthermore, the sergeants 
actions were so closely connected to his employment 
duties that the risk of harm faced by the young women was 
fairly attributable to his employer who had placed the 
sergeant in a position of trust and authority in 
contacting young persons for recruitment into the Guard. 
Sudduthfs conduct, we conclude, was within the scope of 
his employment. The State of Louisiana is thus 
answerable in damages for the injuries sustained by the 
Plaintiffs. 
In this case, Lyday assumed roles of a police officer and 
a teacher/advisor. Both roles had been conferred upon him by West 
Valley, which authorized, directed and sanctioned his position. 
West Valley entrusted Lyday with a powerful position of authority 
over Plaintiff, both in his capacity as a police officer and as 
advisor to the Explorer Post. West Valley taught, directed and 
insisted that Plaintiff and other members of the Post follow the 
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direction of all police officers, especially Lyday. Plaintiff 
would have been subject to discipline and possible expulsion from 
the Post if he had not followed Lydayfs directions. Within the 
hours of Lydayfs work and the boundaries of his employment, (that 
is the city assigned police vehicle,) the incident occurred while 
Lyday was supposedly teaching Plaintiff how to cope with stress as 
a police officer. As in those cases cited above, the municipality 
endowed its employee with extraordinary power and authority which 
enabled the employee to sexually exploit another. The municipality 
should therefore be liable for the consequences of its agents 
misconduct. 
POINT V 
WEST VALLEY NEGLIGENTLY HIRED 
AND SUPERVISED ITS EMPLOYEE, AND PLACED 
LYDAY IN A POSITION TO DEFRAUD 
AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OTHERS 
In Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986) a Honeywell 
employee, Messer, left work at 5:00 p.m., went home, changed 
clothes and then drove his Honeywell van to a club to drink with 
friends. On his way home from the club, more than seven hours 
after leaving work, an accident occurred. Messer was clearly not 
on the clock with Honeywell. The Supreme Court ruled that there 
was no basis for imposing liability on Honeywell, and sustained the 
trial Court's grant of Honeywell's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In so ruling, the court discussed the issue of Respondeat 
Superior. The Court noted that "[t]he question of whether an 
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employee is acting within the scope of his employment at a 
particular time is normally a question for the fact finder" (Id. 
at 490). In a concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman observed that 
there are circumstances where an employer is liable for conduct of 
an employee, even though outside the scope of employment. Justice 
Zimmerman referred to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315 
(1965) which states: 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third 
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to 
another unless...a special relation exists between the 
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the 
actor to control the third persons conduct... 
Id. at 492. 
Justice Zimmerman continued: 
In some cases, a special relationship may exist between 
an employer and an employee that will give rise to such 
a duty to control even when the employee is acting 
outside the scope of employment. However, because the 
employee is acting outside the scope of employment, the 
exposure to liability . . . does not arise simply because 
the employment relationship exists; it is imposed only 
when special circumstances exist and are known to the 
employer. 
Id. at 492. 
In Aaarwal v. Johnson 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 
(1979), the Court noted one of those "special circumstances" which 
will impose liability on the employer. In that case, the employer 
was found liable for willful misconduct of its managerial 
employees. The court stated: 
The reason for the imposition of liability is to 
encourage careful selection and control of persons placed 
in important management positions [citation omitted]. 
Id. at 67. 
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Lyday certainly fits the criterion of being in an 
"important management position". Besides his general managerial 
power as a police officer, he was specifically placed in a 
management position as Explorer advisor over Plaintiff, a Law 
Enforcement Explorer. Lyday directly supervised Plaintiff on the 
nights of the incidents. West Valley was using Plaintiff, under 
Lyday's management, to free it's paid employees for other duties. 
West Valley must be careful to insure that employees 
granted positions of power and authority will not abuse their 
position of trust. Imposition of liability on West Valley would 
encourage careful selection, screening, supervision and control of 
persons placed in important management positions. These policy 
considerations are especially compelling in a situation such as 
this where the persons being supervised are young and vulnerable. 
West Valley City may not avoid liability by saying it 
didn't know what was going on. In Lane v. Messer, Supra, Justice 
Zimmerman stated: 
For example, an employer must exercise reasonable care 
to control an employee acting outside of the scope of 
employment to prevent that employee from creating an 
"unreasonable risk of harm to others" if the employee is 
using the employer's chattels and the employer "knows or 
should know of the necessity and opportunity for 
exercising control". Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 317 (1965); see also Ann. 48 ALR 3rd 359, 
Section 2(b). 
Id. at 492 (emphasis applied). 
Because of the special relationships involved here, West 
Valley had a special obligation to screen, train, observe, and 
supervise Lyday. Had it fulfilled these duties properly, West 
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Valley would have known that Lyday was not an appropriate person 
to be working with young people and could have prevented the injury 
to Plaintiff. It cannot hide behind the fact that it simply did 
not look. 
CONCLUSION 
There are numerous facts in this case upon which 
reasonable minds could rely to conclude that: 
1. West Valley was grossly negligent and ignored 
statutory requirements when it hired Lyday without 
conducting appropriate background investigations and 
psychological testing; 
2. The gross negligence continued and was compounded 
when Lyday was placed in charge of vulnerable young 
people; 
3. Sexual abuse committed by Lyday in his car on police 
time was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy 
committed under color of law; 
4. Wrongful acts committed by Lyday on company time and 
while otherwise engaging in authorized activities 
subject West Valley to liability under the doctrine 
of Respondeat Superior; and, 
5. West Valley placed Lyday in a special position of 
trust whereby Lyday fraudulently took advantage of 
Plaintiff. 
With the above factual issues remaining to be resolved, it is 
clearly inappropriate to rule as a matter of law that there is no 
25 
set of facts upon which a jury could reasonably rule in Plaintiff's 
favor. The summary judgment of the District Court should therefore 
be set aside, with this case remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 3 day of /vn a A A. R-4- . 
1990. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
Richard I. Ashton 
Wayne H. Braunberger 
David A. Wilde 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JASON HEPLER, by and through 
his guardian ad litem, DENNIS 
HEPLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
WEST VALLEY CITY, WEST VALLEY 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and 
JENE V. LYDAY, individually 
and as a Police Officer of 
west valley City, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. C87-06590 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendants west Valley City's and west Valley City Police 
Department's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court 
for hearing on October 30, 1989, pursuant to request for oral 
argument and notice under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Plaintiff was represented by Richard I. Ashton 
and Wayne H. Braunberger and defendants were represented by Allan 
L. Larson and Richard A. Van Wagoner. Having considered the oral 
arguments of counsel and reviewed the entire file, including 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memoranda in Support 
Thereof, plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the depositions, affidavits and pleadings, 
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters 
summary judgment for defendants, for the following reasons: 
1. No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect 
to whether plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation aiose 
from a policy, procedure, custom or practice of the defendants 
because the undisputed facts as a matter of law do not rise to 
the level of a showing of deliberate indifference by defendants 
to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and 
2. No cognizable, recognized constitutional right or 
interest was deprived or implicated by the acts of defendant 
Lyday; and 
3. No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect 
to plaintiff's claim of respondeat superior because the 
undispute'd facts show that defendant Lyday's conduct toward the 
plaintiff was not of the general kind the employee was employed 
to perform, was not generally directed toward the accomplishment 
of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and 
authority or reasonably incidental thereto, was not a part of the 
employer's business and the duties assigned to Mr. Lyday by the 
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employer, and was not motivated by the purpose of serving the 
employer' s interests; 
4. No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect 
to plaintiff's negligence claim because the undisputed facts show 
that defendants did not know, and had no reason to know, of a 
propensity of defendant Lyday toward sexually deviant behavior, 
and absent such notice, defendants had no legal duty to conduct 
general psychological or sexual deviancy testing on Mr, Lyday. 
For the foregoing reasons, and those reasons set forth in 
defendants1 Memoranda in Support of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, incorporated by reference herein, defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted as to all of 
plaintiff's claims, and plaintiff's Complaint is hereby disr.issel 
with prejudice as against West Valley City and its Police 
Department, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of west 
Valley City and its Police Department as against the plaintiff, 
no cause of action, defendant to recover costs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 fT> , 
DATED this ^ ' day of /'.('l^:- '•; / • , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge David S. Young i ^ ' \ 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION DATED JANUARY 17, 1990 
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Wayne H. Braunberger, Esq. (A-0434) 
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& BOUD, P.C. 
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& BURK 
260 Sheridan Avenue 
Suite 208 
Palo Alto, CA 94306 
Telephone (415) 327-0701 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JASON HEPLER, by and through 
his Guardian ad Litem, DENNIS 
HEPLER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEST VALLEY CITY, WEST 
VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
and JENE V. LYDAY, individually 
West Valley City, 
Defendants. 
54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Civil No. C87-6590 
Judge David S. Young 
In accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court hereby expressly finds and determines that 
there is no just reason for delay, and it is hereby expressly 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED and directed that Summary 
Judgment in favor of West Valley City and West Valley City Police 
Department be and hereby is entered. 
DATED this / / iSv o r ^ l 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing 54(b) CERTIFICATION was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
I / day of January, 1990 to the following: 
Allan L. Larson, Esq. 
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
James M. Dunn 
Michael N. Zundel 
Laurie S. Hart 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark Emmett 
102 West 500 South, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C^O^Ld /^LOA^ L*J J^juj 
130-940,db 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
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42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges or 
immunity secured by the constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceedings or redress. . . 
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-6(7) provides in 
pertinent parts as follows: 
Every applicant for admission to the training 
programs conducted by a certified peace officer 
training academy. . . shall meet the following 
standards and requirement before being 
admitted: . . . (7) free of any physical, 
emotional or mental conditions which might 
adversely affect the performance of duty as a 
peace officer as determined through a selection 
process. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-6.5 provides: 
At the time a person is employed or appointed 
as a peace officer the chief executive officer 
of the agency employing or appointing shall 
submit an application together with the 
required background information as provided 
for in section 67-15-6. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-9 provides: 
The minimum standards set forth in this act 
concerning peace officer qualifications and 
training shall in no way be deemed to preclude 
counties, cities or towns in establishing 
standards higher than the minimum standards 
contained in this act. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides: 
Summary Judgment for defending party. The 
party against whom a claim, counter-claim or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
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judgment is sought may, at any time, move with 
or without supporting affidavits for a Summary 
Judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides: 
Motion and Proceedings Thereon. . . The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the Affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
facts and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. . . 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT WEST VALLEY AND 
WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of AtA^xS't"" 
1990 to the following: 
Allan L. Larson, Esq. 
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
James M. Dunn 
Michael N. Zundel 
Laurie S. Hart 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IV^^l Ki*A* LvLgU. 
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